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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 900539-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY 
The facts necessary to resolve whether the Utah courts can 
assert specific personal jurisdiction over Laray Co., James A. 
Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as "Laray1") are not in dispute. In sum, for over 18 years 
1
 The contacts that Laray Co. has to Utah parallels those of 
James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal. While Laray & Co. required 
corporate tax and financial services and James A. Boal, Jr. and 
Raymond Boal required personal tax and accounting services, the 
contacts with the state of Utah are virtually the same. All the 
appellees contracted with Kamdar & Co. on a yearly basis. All 
appellees sent their tax and other financial information to Kamdar 
& Co. in Utah. All the appellees had many telephone calls and 
written correspondences with Kamdar & Co. in Utah regarding the 
accomplishment of these services. All the appellees paid for these 
services to Kamdar & Co. on a yearly contractual basis. All of the 
appellees terminated the services of Kamdar & Co. at the end of the 
Kamdar & Co. was Laray1s accounting division. Yet, rather than 
having its accounting division down the hall from its corporate 
offices, Laray chose to have its accounting division in Utah. 
Now, Laray has refused to pay Kamdar & Co. for services it 
rendered to Laray in 1987 and 1988. 
Kamdar & Co. has been located in Utah since 1971. All 
accounting services rendered for Laray by Kamdar & Co. have been 
performed in Utah (See R.3,77&78). To enable Kamdar & Co. to 
perform these services, each year Laray has delivered to Kamdar & 
Co. all of its financial books and records to Kamdar & Co. in 
Utah. (See R. 62,64,65,77478). Each year, Laray has telephoned 
and sent written correspondence to Kamdar & Co. in Utah regarding 
these very services. (See R.62,64,65&78). 
Accordingly, from 1971 until 1988, Laray hired Kamdar & Co. 
on a yearly basis for these services. These services were paid 
on a yearly basis. Even the termination of Kamdar & Co.'s 
services took place at the end of a year. Each year Laray chose 
to renew its contract to hire Kamdar & Co., a Utah company, to 
perform its tax needs. At the beginning of any given year, it 
last yearly contractual arrangement. Accordingly, throughout the 
appellant's briefing on this matter, references to Laray's contacts 
are equally applicable to an analysis required to find specific 
personal jurisdiction over James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond Boal 
individually. 
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could have chosen to do otherwise. 
In specific part, Laray came to Utah in 1987 and 1988 to 
have its accounting services performed by Kamdar & Co. Yet now 
it wishes to avoid coming to Utah to explain why it refused to 
pay for these very services. This position fails as a matter of 
law. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Laray Has Failed To Make The Distinction Between Specific 
Personal Jurisdiction And General Personal Jurisdiction. 
Laray is living in the past. The Utah cases cited in its 
brief arguing that the Utah courts lack personal jurisdiction 
over it are inapplicable. Each case cited by Laray pre-dates 
Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), 
where Utah Supreme Court specifically articulated the necessary 
distinction between specific personal jurisdiction and general 
personal jurisdiction. See also Roskellev & Co. v. Larco. Inc.. 
610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980). Prior to the Abbott opinion, the Utah 
courts had applied the "doing business test" in determining 
whether either specific or general personal jurisdiction should 
be extended over a non-resident. The Abbott opinion abandoned 
this approach and adopted the modern federal analysis that 
required a distinction be made as a threshold matter between 
general and specific jurisdictions. 
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The recognition by the Utah courts of this distinction was 
succinctly addressed by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah in Nova Mudd Corp, v. L. H. Fletcher. 648 F.Supp 
1123 (D. Utah 1986). In Nova Mudd. the court specifically 
itemized some of these earlier Utah cases which have little 
practical value in determining specific personal jurisdiction 
because of the failure to make a distinction between specific and 
general jurisdiction altogether. These itemized cases included 
United Ski Co. v. Union Plastic Corp.. 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) 
and Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co.. 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). 
These two cases are two of the three central cases cited by Laray 
in support of its position that the court should not exercise 
jurisdiction over it. The third case cited by Laray, White v. 
Arthur Murray. Inc.. 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976), similarly fails to 
distinguish between specific and general personal jurisdiction. 
The only other case cited by Laray in support of its position is 
the Hill v. Zale Corp.. 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971) 
in which the Utah Supreme Court specifically delineated factors 
relevant to the "doing business test." This entire argument and 
the use of these cases is inapplicable to the resolution of the 
present dispute. 
In the present case, Kamdar & Co. does not claim that Laray 
is subject to the court's general jurisdictional authority. 
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Rather, Kamdar & Co. asserts that Laray is subject to the court's 
specific personal jurisdiction authority. Thus, the application 
of the "doing business" rule is improper. As a result, the 
affidavits proffered by Laray which alleges that it does not own 
property in Utah, has no accounts in Utah, no employees or 
otherwise doing business in Utah is immaterial. Rather, the 
issue is whether the contacts it does have with Utah is 
sufficient under Utah's Long-Arm Statute. 
B* Under Utah's Long-Arm Statute, Specific Personal 
Jurisdiction Can Be Asserted Over Laray. 
The facts in the present case directly parallel the declared 
purpose of Utah's Long-Arm Statute. This purpose is stated as 
follows: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest demands the 
state provide its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against non-residents, who, through certain 
significant minimal context with this state, incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's 
protection. This legislative action is deemed 
necessary because of technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of commerce between 
the several states resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons of other 
states. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-22 (1953, as amended). The protection 
intended under Utah's Long-Arm Statute is the protection sought 
by Kamdar & Co. in the present case. In the present case, Laray, 
a California company, came to Utah and contracted with Kamdar & 
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Co., a Utah company, for its accounting services, based on the 
technological advances making such a use more cost effective. 
Now, Laray has refused to pay for these very same services. 
Utah's Long-Arm Statute was intended to protect Utah citizens 
from this type of abuse. In these situations, the Utah courts 
have given themselves jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed 
by the due process of law. See Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 
378, 380 (Utah 1980). It is this protection that Kamdar & Co. 
seeks. It is this type of protection that the statute was meant 
to offer. It is this type of protection that this Court is 
allowed to provide. 
C. All Requirements Are Met To Establish That The Utah Courts 
Have Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Laray. 
As previously discussed in appellant's opening brief, each 
element to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Laray is 
met. First, Laray's contracting with Kamdar & Co., a Utah 
company, for services to be performed within Utah during 1987 and 
1988 falls squarely within the scope of § 78-27-24(1) of the Utah 
Code2. 
2
 Utah's Long-Arm Statute gives further assistance in 
determining what conduct constitutes the transaction of business 
within the state by defining the term "transaction of business 
within the state and to" in § 78-27-23(2) of the Utah Code. 
Pursuant to §78-27-23(2) the transaction of business within the 
state requires conduct by the nonresident that affects persons or 
businesses in the state. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co. . 
701 P.2d 1106,1110 (Utah 1985); Nova Mudd Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 
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In the present case, Laray contracted in 1987 and 1988 to 
have its accounting services rendered in Utah by Kamdar & Co. 
Laray also communicated by telephone and mail with Kamdar & Co. 
enabling Kamdar & Co. to perform the requested services. Laray 
also sent or had delivered to Utah all the materials necessary to 
have the work accomplished in Utah3. Such conduct satisfies this 
first element. 
The second requirement that the cause of action must arise 
from the contact is indisputably met. Laray's contact in Utah is 
its contracts with Kamdar & Co. to do its accounting work. The 
instant dispute is over these very services. 
The final element under a specific personal jurisdiction 
analysis is that hailing the non-resident party into the forum 
F.Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986). 
3
 By analogy, the contacts would have been no more significant 
if Laray, for example, had been a manufacturer of steel and sent 
steel bars to Kamdar & Co. to fabricate into bumpers and then send 
the completed bumpers back to Laray in California to sell. Under 
this scenario, Laray would send all needed raw materials for Kamdar 
& Co. to accomplish its service of creating bumpers which Kamdar & 
Co. takes and preforms its contractual duties for the benefit of 
Laray. 
The same nature of contact is found in the present case 
wherein Laray sends its raw financial tax and financial information 
to Kamdar & Co. to produce finished returns, reports, comparisons, 
etc. These finished documents were then sent back to Laray for the 
purpose of meeting its business objectives. While the fabrication 
of bumpers might facially appear to give more credence to the 
finding of sufficient contacts, the same quality of contacts are 
found in the present case for the contracting of accounting 
services. 
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state does not offend notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. This element is also satisfied. In the present case, 
Laray made a conscious decision each year to employ Kamdar & Co. 
to perform its accounting services in Utah. Laray extended 
itself to the privileges of the State of Utah by employing a Utah 
company to do their work on a yearly basis. Its failure to pay 
for these services contracted for in Utah would be governed by 
Utah law. Its failure to pay for these services will require the 
factual determination as to the value of these services based 
upon the records kept and currently located in Utah. Their 
failure to pay for these services will require the testimony of 
those who performed the services, all of which are located in 
Utah. In sum, the instant dispute arises from services 
contracted for and performed in Utah. Justice dictates that 
Laray having availed itself of the privileges of contracting for 
services to be performed in Utah should also be subjected to 
account in Utah for its failure to pay for these services. 
III. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Kamdar & Co. 
respectfully requests the District Courtfs ruling should be 
reversed and that specific personal jurisdiction should be 
asserted against Laray Co., James A. Boal, Jr. and Raymond 
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Boal for their failure to pay for accounting services contracted 
and performed in Utah by Kamdar & Co. during 1987 and 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17,\' day of February, 1991. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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